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Current warnings during daily Web browsing demonstrate how difficult it is for developers to craft precise
and comprehensible security interventions. While researchers have found that personal contextualization of
interventions help in security-critical applications, taking this approach leads to an overwhelming range of
options of how and when to intervene as well as which factors to consider. To make contextualized security
interventions feasible, we need to support developers in selecting the relevant factors for their applications
and support them in deriving the appropriate intervention strategy and content. In this paper, we propose a
security intervention framework and methodology which provides such a support.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Warnings of self-signed certificates in Web browsing
are an example of how difficult it is to craft
precise and comprehensible security interventions2.
These warnings occur independently from the user’s
intention like browsing for information (a low risk)
or transferring money (a high risk). This imprecision
results in habituation that might cause users to
ignore warnings in critical situations, since they have
ignored them several times without any negative
consequences. The problem here lies in the precision
of this particular security intervention: The warning
about the security of the connection should ideally
only occur if there is a risk for the user from continuing
to use the Web service as intended. Moreover, the
warning is formulated in a technical language that
is not comprehensible by the user: The inadequate
content of the intervention prevents the user from
understanding the risks of continuing to the Web site.
Several studies have shown that common Web
browsing warnings (certificate warnings, Sunshine
et al. (2009)) as well as other security indicators
(passive indicators, Whalen and Inkpen (2005)) are
1The work presented in this paper is supported by funds of the
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection
(BMELV) based on a decision of the Parliament of the Federal
Republic of Germany via the Federal Office for Agriculture and
Food (BLE) under the innovation support programme.
2We consider security interventions as signals to humans that
influence security-relevant decisions, e.g. a green location bar
(positive intervention) or warnings (negative intervention).
not effective. The ineffectiveness is caused by the
traditional approaches on security interventions that
take the form of generic hazard warnings: warn
a broad audience with static texts and symbols
(Wogalter 2006). Accordingly, researchers propose
to personalize and contextualize security indicators
(De Keukelaere et al. 2009). The idea is to employ
additional information on the context (e.g. user
intention) and the user (e.g. expertise) so as to make
better decisions on when to warn, how, and with what
content.
However, this is challenging for developers of
security-critical applications, because they need to
take into consideration both the contextual factors
and user characteristics in order to implement the
correct intervention strategy (whether, when, and
how to intervene) and intervention content (what
content to convey). Developers need to evaluate
available contextual factors, particularly for their
availability and impact. They also have to combine
the factors and balance whether the risks justifies
a blocking warning or whether the negative effects
(habituation, annoyance) are too high (cf. Böhme
and Grossklags 2011). De Keukelaere et al. (2009)
proposed an architecture for contextualized warnings
that evaluates factors so as to decide which type of
warning to display, but did not provide a methodology
to select the relevant factors. Moreover, the content of
the intervention should relate to the user to make the
warning more convincing – for example, by taking the
mental model into account (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011).
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Figure 1: Intervention framework with influences of the factors on intervention strategy and content
One part of this challenge is to assess which threats
and consequences are present in the actual situation,
and whether to emphasize the technical threat (e.g.
man-in-the-middle attack) or potential consequences
(e.g. financial losses).
Developers need to combine different kinds of inter-
ventions (e.g. passive symbols, active warnings) for
optimal results so that developers need broader sup-
port that considers a range of intervention options.
However, prior research on interventions primarily
focused on individual (types of) interventions. The
broad Human-In-The-Loop framework (Cranor 2008)
shows many factors that influence the effectiveness
of security interventions, but remains on a descriptive
level of theory: The framework only describes the
factors, but does not guide the developers on how
to arrive at an intervention.
To better support developers in future, we propose an
intervention framework that relates the intervention
strategy and content to the context and human
factors of a corresponding situation as well as
knowledge bases of human behavior and threats (cf.
Figure 1). We further present a methodology to derive
the relevant factors and knowledge bases, which
employs user studies, literature reviews, and expert
consultations. While applicable in various domains,
we focus on Web browsing as one important
application area when giving examples in this paper.
2. PRIOR RESEARCH ON SECURITY
INTERVENTIONS
Among the areas that security-intervention re-
searchers have focused upon is that of intervention
strategies, that is, when and in which form to in-
tervene. For example, Whalen and Inkpen (2005)
showed how symbols as a passive form of interven-
tions are seen, but not interacted with by the users.
Wu et al. (2006) argued that the right timing is im-
portant for interventions. Generally, active warnings
have been shown to be more effective than passive
indicators (Schechter et al. 2007). However, overly
frequent warnings (e.g. from false positives) lead to
habituation effects (Amer and Maris 2006).
Further research occurred on the content of
interventions. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) showed
empirically that warnings are not understood –
for example, due to technical terminology. Biddle
et al. (2009) found that their reformulated warnings
made users more responsive to different levels
of connection security. Wogalter (2006) argues
that warnings need to inform about or remind
of the threats and consequences. Downs et al.
(2006) showed that phishing warnings are more
often ignored if the threats and consequences are
unknown. Furthermore, Kauer et al. (2012) found that
individuals are more likely to heed warnings if they
perceive personal consequences.
Wogalter (2006) also argues that warnings need to
fit the audience and that personal characteristics
should be taken into account when designing security
indicators. Lin et al. (2011), for example, found
that domain highlighting helps a subset of their
study participants, depending on the participants’
expertise. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) apply the Human-
in-the-Loop framework (Cranor 2008) to warnings
to describe the various factors that influence the
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Indicator Scope Measurement
Trustworthiness of operator Web site Recommendations
Connection encryption Connection Browser
User expertise User Questionnaire
Table 1: Examples of context indicators in Web browsing
behavior of the user – for example, they show that
behavior depends on expertise and prior experience.
To warn in an adequate form and achieve the
necessary impact, De Keukelaere et al. (2009)
proposed to adapt the intervention to the context ;
they found improvements from considering the
security risk and prior actions of the user.
3. SECURITY INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
The goal of the framework is to support the
development of suitable security interventions. The
literature in the previous section points to the primary
concepts of the framework, depicted with their most
important interrelations in Figure 1. The outcome for
the developer is whether, when, and in which form
the intervention appears (intervention strategy, e.g.
active as a warning or passive as a symbol), and what
content it conveys (e.g. technical threats or personal
consequences).
Both the appearance and the content of the
intervention is in our framework primarily influenced
by the context and personal characteristics of the
user. Context indicators measure the security and
further aspects of the context, and vary concerning
scope and type of measurement (see Table 1 for
examples from Web browsing).
The information about the context needs to be in-
terpreted and modulated according to two knowl-
edge bases. The first concerns human behavior,
particularly the trust decisions – e.g. under which
circumstances users will trust a Web site enough to
enter a password (green location bar, professional
design, user expertise). Combining the information
from the context (e.g. whether the location bar is
green) and the knowledge on trust decisions will allow
us to estimate the behavior of the current user and to
what degree the user needs to be influenced through
an intervention. Herein, we take the existing trust
signals (e.g. green location bar) as the base line.
As the second knowledge base, the structure of
relevant threats and consequences enables a more
effective formulation of the content of the intervention.
By interrelating context indicators, threats, and
consequences, the specific consequences relevant
to the situation can be identified. In combination with
the knowledge on trust decisions, those threats and
consequences can be selected that are considered
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Figure 2: Intervention-factor elicitation methodology
most effective for the user (e.g. those with highest
personal value or those unaware of), depending on
her experience and expertise.
4. ELICITATION OF INTERVENTION FACTORS
To operationalize the framework, developers need
to elicit the intervention factors and build the
knowledge bases for their application area (e.g. Web
browsing). We propose the methodology depicted
in Figure 2, which employs expert consultations,
literature reviews, and user studies to elicit the factors
(context indicators, factors in human behavior, and
threats and consequences). Context indicators are
then evaluated for their availability (e.g. how can we
elicit the user’s Web browsing intention). Human-
behavior factors and threats and consequences are
evaluated for their influence on the intervention.
These sources are also used to interrelate context
indicators and factors to derive graphs for the
decisions on the intervention strategy and the
dynamic construction of intervention content: How
threats may lead to specific consequences, and
how context indicators signal specific behavior and
threats. Lastly, a gap analysis is performed based
on the graphs (e.g. for missing context indicators to
identify specific threats) and may trigger an additional
iteration.
Not all of these activities will be necessary in their en-
tirety for each newly developed intervention. We fore-
see general and domain-specific knowledge bases,
which, for example, are provided by researchers and
which developers then tailor to the specific applica-
tion.
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5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We collected first experiences on applying the
methodology in two application areas: Contextualized
warnings for Web browsing, which, amongst other
aspects, consider the intentions of the user; and
for email communication, e.g. addressing malicious
email content (phishing) and attachments. In both
cases, we conducted literature reviews for human
behavior (to identify how indicators influence users),
context indicators (what indicators exist and how they
can be measured), and threats (which threats and
consequences exist in the application). In addition,
we applied expert consultations for threat analysis
(how are the various threats and consequences
interrelated and how do they relate to context
indicators) and user studies (how can we elicit
the intentions of users in Web browsing as a
context indicator). By applying the methodology, we
could already derive promising dynamic warnings for
concrete situations.
The primary goal for future work is to evaluate the
practical applicability of the methodology on two
levels: regarding the resulting intervention (efficiency
and effectiveness of the intervention for the users)
and regarding the development process for the
developer. Since the evaluation of generative theories
is generally challenging (experimental settings are
difficult), we will analytically evaluate the developer
effort as the first step and conduct user studies
on the resulting interventions. The evaluation will
also include the level of complexity of the factors
that is necessary to arrive at superior interventions.
Lastly, we will study in which ways we can generalize
knowledge bases and algorithms that build upon the
framework to derive interventions.
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